Lecture time: | Monday 14-16 |
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Lecture room: | 024, Campus E 1.4 (5.11. 029, E 1.5) |
Lecturer: | Sayan Bhattacharya, Rob van Stee |
Tutorial time: | TBA |
Tutorial room: | 024, Campus E 1.4 |
Tutor: | Sebastian Ott |
Audience: |
The course counts as computer science lecture (4 SWS, 6 CP).
The lecture will be given in English. |
Prerequisites: | Basics in discrete mathematics, optimization, algorithms, and complexity. |
Schedule: |
The first lecture will take place on Monday, October 15.
|
Exercises: | We will hand out exercises every week and each student should score at least 50% in the first half of the course and 50% in the second half in order to be allowed to take the exam. |
Final Exam: |
Oral (30 minutes), in the last week of the semester
|
Re-Exam: | 8 April 2013, 14-16. Contact Sebastian Ott
for an appointment. If you participate in the re-exam, your grade you get there will replace your exam grade. |
Book: | Algorithmic Game Theory |
The Internet is a structure that has not been created by a single entity, but rather emerged from the interaction of many agents, individuals or companies. Agents normally aim at maximizing their individual benefits. For example, an individual might want to minimize the cost he pays for an item from an online store, or to maximize the bandwidth they get from a service provider. These agents can be viewed as players in a large, distributed game that aim at maximizing their individual utilities, possibly at the cost of other players.
This class will focus on algorithmic aspects of economics and game theory as they arise in modern information networks. We will cover a range of topics at the intersection of classical game theory and algorithm design, such as equilibrium concepts, mechanism design, auctions, non-cooperative and cooperative games, inefficiency of equilibria.
Date | Topic | Reference | Homework | Lecturer | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Oct 15 | Introduction to game theory | Chapter 1 | 1 | van Stee | |
Oct 22 | Two-player zero-sum games, best responses | 1.4, 2.1 | 2 | van Stee | -->|
Oct 29 | Complexity of Nash, mechanism design | 2.2-3, 9.3.1 | 3 | van Stee | -->|
Nov 5 | VCG-mechanisms | 9.1-3 | 4 | van Stee | -->|
Nov 12 | Single-minded bidders | 11.1-2 | 5 | van Stee | -->|
Nov 19 | Algorithmic mechanism design | AMD paper | 6 | van Stee | |
Nov 26 | Truthful scheduling | 1, 2 | 7 | van Stee | |
Dec 3 | Truthful scheduling, the price of anarchy | 1, 2 | 8 | van Stee | |
Dec 10 | The price of anarchy and stability | 18.1-2, 19.3 | 9 | -- | Huang | -->
Dec 17 | Local connection game (missing proof) | 19.2 | 10 | van Stee | -->|
Jan 7 | Smooth games | Robust PoA Paper | 11 | Bhattacharya | |
Jan 14 | Bayesian Mechanism design | 9.5, 9.6, 13.2 | 12 | Bhattacharya | |
Jan 21 | Prior-free auctions | 13 | Bhattacharya | ||
Jan 28 | Current paper | -- | Bhattacharya |