

Model Checking of Fault-Tolerant Distributed Algorithms

Part IV: Parameterized Model Checking of Fault-tolerant Distributed Algorithms by Abstraction

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in Systems Engineering

RiSE
Rigorous Systems Engineering

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Fault-tolerant DAs: Model Checking Challenges

- unbounded data types

counting how many messages have been received

- parameterization in multiple parameters

among n processes $f \leq t$ are faulty with $n > 3t$

- contrast to concurrent programs

fault tolerance against adverse environments

- degrees of concurrency

many degrees of partial synchrony



- continuous time

fault-tolerant clock synchronization

Model checking problem for fault-tolerant DA algorithms

Parameterized model checking problem:



- given a distributed algorithm and spec. φ
- show for all n , t , and f satisfying $n > 3t \wedge t \geq f \geq 0$
 $M(n, t, f) \models \varphi$
- every $M(n, t, f)$ is a system of $n - f$ correct processes



Model checking problem for fault-tolerant DA algorithms

Parameterized model checking problem:

- given a distributed algorithm and spec. φ
- show for all n , t , and f satisfying *resilience condition*
 $M(n, t, f) \models \varphi$
- every $M(n, t, f)$ is a system of $N(n, f)$ correct processes



Properties in Linear Temporal Logic

Unforgeability (U). If $v_i = 0$ for all correct processes i , then for all correct processes j , accept_j remains 0 forever.

$$\mathbf{G} \left(\left(\bigwedge_{i=1}^{n-f} v_i = 0 \right) \rightarrow \mathbf{G} \left(\bigwedge_{j=1}^{n-f} \text{accept}_j = 0 \right) \right)$$

Completeness (C). If $v_i = 1$ for all correct processes i , then there is a correct process j that eventually sets accept_j to 1.

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Relay (R). If a correct process i sets accept_i to 1, then eventually all correct processes j set accept_j to 1.

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Threshold-guarded fault-tolerant distributed algorithms

Threshold-guarded FTDAs

Fault-free construct: quantified guards ($t=f=0$)

- Existential Guard
if received m from *some* process then ...
- Universal Guard
if received m from *all* processes then ...

These guards allow one to treat the processes in a parameterized way

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Fault-Tolerant Algorithms: n processes, at most t are Byzantine

- Threshold Guard
if received m from $n - t$ processes then ...
- (the processes *cannot refer to f !*)

Control Flow Automata

Variables of process i
$$v_j: \{0, 1\} \text{ init with 0 or 1}$$
$$accept_i: \{0, 1\} \text{ init with } 0$$

An indivisible step:

if $v_i = 1$

```
then send (echo) to all;
```

if received (echo) from at least $t + 1$ distinct processes

```
and not sent (echo) before
then send (echo) to all;
```


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
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then $accept_i := 1$;

$n - f$ copies of the process




Counting argument in threshold-guarded algorithms




Correct processes count **distinct** incoming messages

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


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
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
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- Parametric Interval Abstraction (PIA)
- Similar to interval abstraction:
 $[t + 1, n - t)$ rather than $[4, 10)$.
- **Total order:** $0 < 1 < t + 1 < n - t$ for all parameters satisfying RC:
 $n > 3t, t \geq f \geq 0$.

Technical challenges

We have to reduce the verification of an infinite number of instances where

- ① the process code is parameterized
- ② the number of processes is parameterized

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Technical challenges

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- 1 PIA data abstraction
- 2 PIA counter abstraction

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
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
abstraction is an over approximation \Rightarrow possible abstract behavior that does not correspond to a concrete behavior.

- 3 Refining spurious counter-examples


Abstraction overview



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


Data abstraction




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Abstract operations




Concrete $t + 1 \leq x$

Abstract operations



Concrete $t+1 \leq x$ is abstracted as $x = I_{t+1} \vee x = I_{n-t}$.


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Abstract operations




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


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 & x = I_0 \quad \wedge \quad x' = I_1 \\
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


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


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
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
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abstract increase may keep the same value!


Abstract CFA



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Abstraction overview



Counter abstraction

Classic $(0, 1, \infty)$ -counter abstraction

Pnueli, Xu, and Zuck (2001) introduced $(0, 1, \infty)$ -counter abstraction:

- finitely many local states,
e.g., $\{N, T, C\}$.
- based on counter representation:
for each local states count how many processes are in it

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- finitely many local states,
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- based on counter representation:
for each local states count how many processes are in it
- **abstract** the number of processes in every state,
e.g., $K : C \mapsto \mathbf{0}, \quad T \mapsto \mathbf{1}, \quad N \mapsto \text{"many"}$.
- perfectly reflects mutual exclusion properties
e.g., $\mathbf{G}(K(C) = \mathbf{0} \vee K(C) = \mathbf{1})$.

Limits of $(0, 1, \infty)$ -counter abstraction

Our parametric data + counter abstraction:

- we require finer counting of processes:
 - $t + 1$ processes in a specific state can force global progress,
 - t processes cannot
- mapping t , $t + 1$, and $n - t$ to “many” is too coarse.

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
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starting point of our approach...

Data + counter abstraction over parametric intervals

$$n = 6, t = 1, f = 1$$

$$t + 1 = 2, n - t = 5$$




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
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
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
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Abstraction refinement

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
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... and a new abstraction phenomenon


Parametric abst. refinement — uniformly spurious paths

Classic case:





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
Our case:






Model Checking


CEGAR — automated workflow




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What is SMT?

recall SAT:

- given a Boolean formula, e.g., $(\neg a \vee \neg b \vee c) \wedge (\neg a \vee b \vee d \vee e)$
- is there an assignment of TRUE and FALSE to variables a, b, c, d, e such that the formula evaluates to TRUE?

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Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) :

- here just linear arithmetics
- given a formula, e.g.,

$$x = y \wedge y = z \wedge u \neq x \wedge (x + y \leq 1 \wedge 2x + y = 1) \vee 3x + 2y \geq 3$$

- is there an assignment of values to u, x, y, z such that formula evaluates to TRUE?
- practically efficient tools: YICES, Z3

Counter example: losing processes

Output of data abstraction: **16** local states: $L = \{(sv, nr\hat{c}vd)\}$
with $sv \in \{v0, v1, sent, accepted\}$ and $rcvd \in \{I_0, I_1, I_{t+1}, I_{n-t}\}$

An abstract global state is $(\hat{k}, n\hat{s}nt)$,
where $n\hat{s}nt \in \{I_0, I_1, I_{t+1}, I_{n-t}\}$ and $\hat{k} : L \rightarrow \{I_0, I_1, I_{t+1}, I_{n-t}\}$

Consider an abstract trace:

$n\hat{s}nt_1 = I_0$	$n\hat{s}nt_2 = I_1$	$n\hat{s}nt_3 = I_{t+1}$
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Encode the last state in SMT as a conjunction T of the constraints:

resilience condition

$$n > 3t \wedge t \geq f \wedge f \geq 0$$

zero counters

$$(i \neq 4 \wedge i \neq 8) \rightarrow 0 \leq k_3[i] < 1$$

UNSAT

non-zero counters

$$n - t \leq k_3[4] \wedge t + 1 \leq k_3[8] < n - t$$

system size

$$n - f = k_3[0] + k_3[1] + \dots + k_3[15]$$

Counter example: losing processes

Output of data abstraction: **16** local states: $L = \{(sv, nr\hat{c}vd)\}$
with $sv \in \{v0, v1, sent, accepted\}$ and $rcvd \in \{I_0, I_1, I_{t+1}, I_{n-t}\}$

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Remove transitions

- We ask the SMT solver:
is there a satisfiable assignment for T ?
- if yes,

then the state is OK, may be part of a real counterexample
- if not, then the state is spurious

remove transitions to that state in the abstract system


Liveness

- distributed algorithm requires reliable communication
- every message sent is eventually received
- $\neg in_transit \equiv [\forall i. nrcvd_i \geq nsnt]$
- fairness **F G** $\neg in_transit$ necessary to verify **liveness**,
e.g., $(\mathbf{F G} \neg in_transit \rightarrow (\mathbf{G} ([\forall i. sv_i = v1] \rightarrow \mathbf{F} [\forall i. sv_i = accept])))$


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counter example (lasso):




Liveness — fairness suppression



if there is a spurious s_j (all its concretizations violate $\neg in_transit$),
then the loop is spurious.


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
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
experimental evaluation

Concrete vs. parameterized (Byzantine case)

Time to check relay (sec, logscale)



Memory to check relay (MB, logscale)



- Parameterized model checking performs well (the red line).
- Experiments for fixed parameters quickly degrade ($n = 9$ runs out of memory).
- We found counter-examples for the cases $n = 3t$ and $f > t$, where the resilience condition is violated.

Experimental results at a glance

Algorithm	Fault	Resilience	Property	Valid?	#Refinements	Time
ST87	BYZ	$n > 3t$	U	✓	0	4 sec.
ST87	BYZ	$n > 3t$	C	✓	10	32 sec.
ST87	BYZ	$n > 3t$	R	✓	10	24 sec.
ST87	SYMM	$n > 2t$	U	✓	0	1 sec.
ST87	SYMM	$n > 2t$	C	✓	2	3 sec.
ST87	SYMM	$n > 2t$	R	✓	12	16 sec.
ST87	OMIT	$n > 2t$	U	✓	0	1 sec.
ST87	OMIT	$n > 2t$	C	✓	5	6 sec.
ST87	OMIT	$n > 2t$	R	✓	5	10 sec.
ST87	CLEAN	$n > t$	U	✓	0	2 sec.
ST87	CLEAN	$n > t$	C	✓	4	8 sec.
ST87	CLEAN	$n > t$	R	✓	13	31 sec.
CT96	CLEAN	$n > t$	U	✓	0	1 sec.
CT96	CLEAN	$n > t$	A	✓	0	1 sec.
CT96	CLEAN	$n > t$	R	✓	0	1 sec.
CT96	CLEAN	$n > t$	C	✗	0	1 sec.

When resilience condition is wrong...

Algorithm	Fault	Resilience	Property	Valid?	#Refinements	Time
ST87	BYZ	$n > 3t \wedge f \leq t+1$	U	X	9	56 sec.
ST87	BYZ	$n > 3t \wedge f \leq t+1$	C	X	11	52 sec.
ST87	BYZ	$n > 3t \wedge f \leq t+1$	R	X	10	17 sec.
ST87	BYZ	$n \geq 3t \wedge f \leq t$	U	✓	0	5 sec.
ST87	BYZ	$n \geq 3t \wedge f \leq t$	C	✓	9	32 sec.
ST87	BYZ	$n \geq 3t \wedge f \leq t$	R	X	30	78 sec.
ST87	SYMM	$n > 2t \wedge f \leq t+1$	U	X	0	2 sec.
ST87	SYMM	$n > 2t \wedge f \leq t+1$	C	X	2	4 sec.
ST87	SYMM	$n > 2t \wedge f \leq t+1$	R	✓	8	12 sec.
ST87	OMIT	$n \geq 2t \wedge f \leq t$	U	✓	0	1 sec.
ST87	OMIT	$n \geq 2t \wedge f \leq t$	C	X	0	2 sec.
ST87	OMIT	$n \geq 2t \wedge f \leq t$	R	X	0	2 sec.

Summary of results

- Abstraction tailored for distributed algorithms
 - threshold-based
 - fault-tolerant
 - allows to express different fault assumptions
- Verification of threshold-based fault-tolerant algorithms
 - with threshold guards that are widely used
 - Byzantine faults (and other)
 - for all system sizes

Related work: non-parameterized

Model checking of the small size instances:

- clock synchronization [Steiner, Rushby, Sorea, Pfeifer 2004]
- consensus [Tsuchiya, Schiper 2011]
- asynchronous agreement, folklore broadcast, condition-based consensus [John, Konnov, Schmid, Veith, Widder 2013]
- and more...

Related work: parameterized case

Regular model checking of fault-tolerant distributed protocols:

[Fisman, Kupferman, Lustig 2008]

- “First-shot” theoretical framework.
- No guards like $x \geq t + 1$, only $x \geq 1$.
- No implementation.
- Manual analysis applied to folklore broadcast (**crash faults**).

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Backward reachability using SMT with arrays:

[Alberti, Ghilardi, Pagani, Ranise, Rossi 2010-2012]

- **Implementation**.
- **Experiments** on Chandra-Toueg 1990.
- No resilience conditions like $n > 3t$.
- Safety only.

Our current work

Discrete synchronous	Discrete partially synchronous	Discrete asynchronous	Continuous synchronous	Continuous partially synchronous
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One instance/
finite payload

Many inst./
finite payload


Many inst./
unbounded
payload

Messages with
reals

one-shot broadcast, c.b.consensus

core of {ST87,
BT87, CT96},
MA06 (common),
MR04 (binary)

Future work: threshold guards + orthogonal features




Thank you!


[<http://forsyte.at/software/bymc>]

the implementation


Tool Chain: BYMC





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Experimental setup



The tool (source code in OCaml),
the code of the distributed algorithms in Parametric Promela,
and a virtual machine with full setup
are available at: <http://forsyte.at/software/bymc>

Running the tool — concrete case

- user specifies parameter value
- useful to check whether the code behaves as expected
- `$bymc/verifyco-spin "N=4,T=1,F=1" bcast-byz.pml relay`
 - model checking problem in directory
“`./x/spin-bcast-byz-relay-N=4,T=1,F=1`”
 - in `concrete.prm`
 - parameters are replaced by numbers
 - process prototype is replaced with $N - F = 3$ active processes

Running the tool — parameterized model checking

- PIA data and counter abstraction
- finite-state model checking on abstract model
- `$bymc/verifypa-spin bcast-omit.pml relay`
 - model checking problem in directory
“./x/bcast-byz-relay-yymdd-HHMM.*”
 - directory contains
 - `abs-interval.prm`: result of the data abstraction;
 - `abs-counter.prm`: result of the counter abstraction;
 - `abs-vass.prm`: auxiliary abstraction for abstraction refinement;
 - `mc.out`: the last output by SPIN;
 - `cex.trace`: the counterexample (if there is one);
 - `yices.log`: communication log with YICES.

Fairness, Refinement, and Invariants


- In the Byzantine case we have $in_transit : \forall i. (nrcvd_i \geq nsnt)$ and $\mathbf{GF} \neg in_transit$.
- In this case communication fairness implies computation fairness.
- But in the abstract version $nsnt$ can deviate from the number of processes who sent the echo message.
- In this case the user formulates a simple state invariant candidate, e.g., $nsnt = K([sv = SE \vee sv = AC])$ (on the level of the original concrete system).
- The tool checks automatically, whether the candidate is actually a state invariant.
- After the abstraction the abstract version of the invariant restricts the behavior of the abstract transition system.

Parametric abstraction refinement—justice suppression

justice $\mathbf{GF} \neg in_transit$ necessary to verify liveness

Parametric abstraction refinement—justice suppression


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


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
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
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


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asynchronous reliable broadcast (srikanth & toueg 1987)

the core of the classic broadcast algorithm from the da literature.
it solves an agreement problem depending on the inputs v_i .

Variables of process i

v_i : $\{0, 1\}$ **init with 0 or 1**

$accept_i$: $\{0, 1\}$ **init with 0**

An indivisible step:

if $v_i = 1$

then **send** (echo) **to all**;

if received (echo) from at least

$t + 1$ distinct processes

and not sent (echo) before

then **send** (echo) **to all**;

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then $accept_i := 1$;

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correct if $n > 3t$
resilience condition rc


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parameterized process
skeleton $p(n, t)$

Abstract CFA



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