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Algorithmic Game Theory (Summer 2010)

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  • 27-Jun: Homework set n. 6 is now available on the website.
Lecture time: Tuesday 16:00-18:00
Lecture room: 001, Campus E 1.3
Lecturers: Vincenzo Bonifaci, Khaled Elbassioni and Angelina Vidali
Tutorial time: Monday 18:00-19:30
Tutorial room: 024, Campus E 1.4
Tutor(s): Fidaa Abed
Book: Algorithmic Game Theory
Available online (user: agt1user, pass: camb2agt)

The Internet is a structure that has not been created by a single entity, but rather emerged from the interaction of many agents, individuals or companies. Agents normally aim at maximizing their individual benefits. For example, an individual might want to minimize the cost he pays for an item from an online store, or to maximize the bandwidth they get from a service provider. These agents can be viewed as players in a large, distributed game that aim at maximizing their individual utilities, possibly at the cost of other players.

This class will focus on algorithmic aspects of economics and game theory as they arise in modern information networks. We will cover a range of topics at the intersection of classical game theory and algorithm design, such as equilibrium concepts, mechanism design, auctions, non-cooperative and cooperative games, inefficiency of equilibria.

Date Topic Reference Homework Lecturer
Apr 13 Introduction and Basic Concepts Chapter 1 Chien-Chung
Apr 20 Equilibrium Computation Chapter 3 (3.1-3.5) HW 1 Khaled
Apr 27 Congestion Games and Potential Games I 17.1,17.2.2,17.3,
19.1,19.3 (up to and including 19.3.3)
HW 2 Vincenzo
May 4 Social Choice, Mechanisms without Money 1.1,1.2
The proof we sketched in the lecture was based on:
The Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Revisited, Lars-Gunnar Svensson
You might also want (it is interesting, though it is not necessary) to take a look on that monograph Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth J. Arrow
HW 3 Angelina
May 11 Truthfulness, the Revelation Principle and the VCG mechanism 9.3,9.4 HW 4 Angelina
May 18 Combinatorial Auctions I 11.2,12.3 Khaled
May 25 Combinatorial Auctions II 11.2,12.3
Lecture note on fractional VCG
HW 5 Khaled
Jun 1 Scheduling Mechanisms I pages 15-36 from here
(You can find suggestions for additional reading in pages 35-36)
Relevant slides
Jun 8 Congestion Games and Potential Games II 19.3.4 plus
Jun 15 Scheduling Mechanisms II same as Scheduling Mechanisms I
Jun 22 Cost Sharing 15.1,15.2,15.3,15.5
HW 6 Angelina
Jun 29 Ad-Auctions I Chapter 28
Jul 6 Ad-Auctions II Chapter 28
Paper on online revenue maximization
HW 7 Khaled
Jul 13 Selfish Routing I Chapter 18 (18.1,18.2.1,18.3.1)
HW 8 Chien-Chung
Jul 20 Selfish Routing II Chapter 18 (18.4.1,18.5.2)

Prerequisites: Basics in discrete mathematics, optimization, algorithms, and complexity.
Policies: This is a 6-credit-point course.
References: Algorithmic Game Theory, edited by N.Nisan, T.Roughgarden, E.Tardos, V.Vazirani, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Exam dates: May 31 (midterm) - Room 024 (E1.4), starting at 18:00
July 27 (final) - Room 001, starting at 16:00
October 6 (re-exam)


# Grade
2512640 2.3
2525909 1.7
2529289 1.3
2530755 --
2516976 1.3
2516911 --
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