max planck institut
informatik
informatik
| Lecture time: | Tuesday 16:00-18:00 |
|---|---|
| Lecture room: | 001, Campus E 1.3 |
| Lecturers: | Vincenzo Bonifaci, Khaled Elbassioni and Angelina Vidali |
| Tutorial time: | Monday 18:00-19:30 |
| Tutorial room: | 024, Campus E 1.4 |
| Tutor(s): | Fidaa Abed |
| Book: | Algorithmic Game Theory |
| Available online (user: agt1user, pass: camb2agt) |
The Internet is a structure that has not been created by a single entity, but rather emerged from the interaction of many agents, individuals or companies. Agents normally aim at maximizing their individual benefits. For example, an individual might want to minimize the cost he pays for an item from an online store, or to maximize the bandwidth they get from a service provider. These agents can be viewed as players in a large, distributed game that aim at maximizing their individual utilities, possibly at the cost of other players.
This class will focus on algorithmic aspects of economics and game theory as they arise in modern information networks. We will cover a range of topics at the intersection of classical game theory and algorithm design, such as equilibrium concepts, mechanism design, auctions, non-cooperative and cooperative games, inefficiency of equilibria.
| Date | Topic | Reference | Homework | Lecturer |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr 13 | Introduction and Basic Concepts | Chapter 1 | Chien-Chung | |
| Apr 20 | Equilibrium Computation | Chapter 3 (3.1-3.5) | HW 1 | Khaled |
| Apr 27 | Congestion Games and Potential Games I | 17.1,17.2.2,17.3, 19.1,19.3 (up to and including 19.3.3) |
HW 2 | Vincenzo |
| May 4 | Social Choice, Mechanisms without Money | 1.1,1.2 The proof we sketched in the lecture was based on: The Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem Revisited, Lars-Gunnar Svensson You might also want (it is interesting, though it is not necessary) to take a look on that monograph Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth J. Arrow |
HW 3 | Angelina |
| May 11 | Truthfulness, the Revelation Principle and the VCG mechanism | 9.3,9.4 | HW 4 | Angelina |
| May 18 | Combinatorial Auctions I | 11.2,12.3 | Khaled | |
| May 25 | Combinatorial Auctions II | 11.2,12.3 Lecture note on fractional VCG |
HW 5 | Khaled |
| Jun 1 | Scheduling Mechanisms I | pages 15-36 from
here (You can find suggestions for additional reading in pages 35-36) Relevant slides |
Angelina | |
| Jun 8 | Congestion Games and Potential Games II | 19.3.4 plus Handout |
Vincenzo | |
| Jun 15 | Scheduling Mechanisms II | same as Scheduling Mechanisms I |
Angelina | |
| Jun 22 | Cost Sharing | 15.1,15.2,15.3,15.5 |
HW 6 | Angelina |
| Jun 29 | Ad-Auctions I | Chapter 28 |
Khaled | |
| Jul 6 | Ad-Auctions II | Chapter 28 Paper on online revenue maximization |
HW 7 | Khaled |
| Jul 13 | Selfish Routing I | Chapter 18 (18.1,18.2.1,18.3.1) |
HW 8 | Chien-Chung |
| Jul 20 | Selfish Routing II | Chapter 18 (18.4.1,18.5.2) Handout |
Vincenzo |
| Prerequisites: | Basics in discrete mathematics, optimization, algorithms, and complexity. | |
|---|---|---|
| Policies: | This is a 6-credit-point course. | |
| References: | Algorithmic Game Theory, edited by N.Nisan, T.Roughgarden, E.Tardos, V.Vazirani, Cambridge University Press, 2007. |
|
| Exam dates: |
May 31 (midterm) - Room 024 (E1.4), starting at 18:00 July 27 (final) - Room 001, starting at 16:00 October 6 (re-exam) |
| # | Grade |
|---|---|
| 2512640 | 2.3 |
| 2525909 | 1.7 |
| 2529289 | 1.3 |
| 2530755 | -- |
| 2516976 | 1.3 |
| 2516911 | -- |