Lecture time:  Tuesday 16:0018:00 

Lecture room:  001, Campus E 1.3 
Lecturers:  Vincenzo Bonifaci, Khaled Elbassioni and Angelina Vidali 
Tutorial time:  Monday 18:0019:30 
Tutorial room:  024, Campus E 1.4 
Tutor(s):  Fidaa Abed 
Book:  Algorithmic Game Theory 
Available online (user: agt1user, pass: camb2agt) 
The Internet is a structure that has not been created by a single entity, but rather emerged from the interaction of many agents, individuals or companies. Agents normally aim at maximizing their individual benefits. For example, an individual might want to minimize the cost he pays for an item from an online store, or to maximize the bandwidth they get from a service provider. These agents can be viewed as players in a large, distributed game that aim at maximizing their individual utilities, possibly at the cost of other players.
This class will focus on algorithmic aspects of economics and game theory as they arise in modern information networks. We will cover a range of topics at the intersection of classical game theory and algorithm design, such as equilibrium concepts, mechanism design, auctions, noncooperative and cooperative games, inefficiency of equilibria.
Date  Topic  Reference  Homework  Lecturer 

Apr 13  Introduction and Basic Concepts  Chapter 1  ChienChung  
Apr 20  Equilibrium Computation  Chapter 3 (3.13.5)  HW 1  Khaled 
Apr 27  Congestion Games and Potential Games I  17.1,17.2.2,17.3, 19.1,19.3 (up to and including 19.3.3) 
HW 2  Vincenzo 
May 4  Social Choice, Mechanisms without Money  1.1,1.2 The proof we sketched in the lecture was based on: The Proof of the GibbardSatterthwaite Theorem Revisited, LarsGunnar Svensson You might also want (it is interesting, though it is not necessary) to take a look on that monograph Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth J. Arrow 
HW 3  Angelina 
May 11  Truthfulness, the Revelation Principle and the VCG mechanism  9.3,9.4  HW 4  Angelina 
May 18  Combinatorial Auctions I  11.2,12.3  Khaled  
May 25  Combinatorial Auctions II  11.2,12.3 Lecture note on fractional VCG 
HW 5  Khaled 
Jun 1  Scheduling Mechanisms I  pages 1536 from
here (You can find suggestions for additional reading in pages 3536) Relevant slides 
Angelina  
Jun 8  Congestion Games and Potential Games II  19.3.4 plus Handout 
Vincenzo  
Jun 15  Scheduling Mechanisms II  same as Scheduling Mechanisms I 
Angelina  
Jun 22  Cost Sharing  15.1,15.2,15.3,15.5 
HW 6  Angelina 
Jun 29  AdAuctions I  Chapter 28 
Khaled  
Jul 6  AdAuctions II  Chapter 28 Paper on online revenue maximization 
HW 7  Khaled 
Jul 13  Selfish Routing I  Chapter 18 (18.1,18.2.1,18.3.1) 
HW 8  ChienChung 
Jul 20  Selfish Routing II  Chapter 18 (18.4.1,18.5.2) Handout 
Vincenzo 
Prerequisites:  Basics in discrete mathematics, optimization, algorithms, and complexity.  

Policies:  This is a 6creditpoint course.  
References:  Algorithmic Game Theory, edited by N.Nisan, T.Roughgarden, E.Tardos, V.Vazirani, Cambridge University Press, 2007. 

Exam dates: 
May 31 (midterm)  Room 024 (E1.4), starting at 18:00 July 27 (final)  Room 001, starting at 16:00 October 6 (reexam) 
#  Grade 

2512640  2.3 
2525909  1.7 
2529289  1.3 
2530755   
2516976  1.3 
2516911   